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VAT FRAUD – TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTIONS
Richard Thompson Ainsworth
Every VAT/GST allows missing trader fraud.1 The fraud is simple, and can be
simply prevented (with technology). The fraud arises when a business makes a purchase
without paying VAT,2 collects VAT on an onward sale, and then “disappears” without
remitting the tax.3 Missing trader fraud is common in high-value/ low-volume goods sold
across borders – computer chips and cell phones are the classic examples.4 But the fraud
easily migrates when pursued. It operates well with goods as wide ranging as xenon
bulbs,5 automobiles,6 and earth moving equipment.7

1

This statement is broad. It is intended to include all multi-stage consumption taxes – the standard
European credit-invoice VAT, all similar VATs or GSTs (whether at the national level or the sub-national
level as in the Canadian Harmonized Sales Tax [HST], Provincial Sales Tax [PST], or the Quebec Sales
Tax [QST]), the Brazilian ICMS (Impostos Sobre Circulacao de Mercadorias e Prestacao de Servicos) and
the Japanese Consumption Tax (CT).
2
There are a number of circumstances in every VAT system where standard business-to-business
transactions occur without VAT. Most notable are transactions for sales of goods between Member States
in the EU. Another common instance is a services transaction between two VAT jurisdictions. The
standard result in these cases is for the purchasing business to self-assess the VAT due (called a reverse
charge).
3
Commission Staff Working Papers, On Measures to change the VAT system to fight fraud,
COM(2008)109 final at 8, available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/vat/SEC(2008)249_en.pdf
4
HOUSE OF LORDS, EUROPEAN UNION COMMITTEE, STOPPING THE CAROUSEL: MISSING TRADER FRAUD IN
THE EU (REPORT WITH EVIDENCE) HL Paper 101(May 25, 2007) 7 (indicating that HMRC believes in 2006
that MTIC is predominantly a fraud in cell phones and computer chips). But see: Fabrizio Borselli,
Pragmatic Policies to Tackle VAT Fraud in the European Union, Int. VAT Monitor (Sept./ Oct. 2008) at
333 (observing that data from the Office of National Statistics reported a significant reduction in MTIC
fraud adjustments in the first quarters of 2006 corresponding with a rise in UK VAT receipts, but Borselli
observes that this data only reflected efforts in the cell phone and computer chip market and that most
likely MTIC had moved on to other markets undetected – and indeed it had as 2006 was the year when
MTIC began in the EU CO2 markets, although it was not detected until 2010).
5
Violetta Krasnowska-Salustowicz & Wojciech Surmacz, VAT Spins, and We With It (VAT się kręci, a my
z nim) NEWSWEEK POLSKA (Mar. 21, 2010) (indicating that the largest tax fraud in Poland involving xenon
light bulbs for automobiles recorded sales in several months larger than the annual demand in the European
Union) available at: http://www.newsweek.pl/artykuly/wydanie/1171/vat-sie-kreci--a-my-z-nim,55162,1
(in Polish).
6
Richard T. Ainsworth, Tackling VAT Fraud: Car Flipping and Computer Chips on a Carousel, 46 TNI
267 (Apr. 16, 2007) (discussing the largest GST fraud in Canada involving the sale of automobiles through
tax exempt members of First Nations); Richard T. Ainsworth, Car Flipping in the UK: The VAT Fraud
Marketplace and Certified Solutions, 47 TNI 1157 (Sept. 24, 2007) (discussing how the same fraud in
automobiles was replicated in the UK but instead of using the GST exemption given to members of the
First Nation, the UK fraudsters took advantage of the VAT exemption provided to handicapped individuals
and applying it in sales of high end auto like Lamborghini, Ferrari and Maserati).
7
Regina v Solty, CarswellOnt 5861; [2005] G.S.T.C. 31 (Mar. 3, 2003) (heavy equipment HST fraud
between businesses in the Canadian Maritime Provinces, Ontario and Alberta); Robert Lee, UK Uncovers
VAT Fraud Network, TAXNEWS.COM (Aug. 11, 2010) (discussing a multimillion dollar carousel fraud
involving an organized crime syndicate and the sale of caravans and motor homes) available at:
http://www.tax-news.com/news/UK_Uncovers_VAT_Fraud_Network_44775.html
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MTIC and Carousel Fraud
In the European Union missing trader fraud is commonly known as missing trader
intra-Community (MTIC) fraud, because an intra-Community goods transaction (a
business-to-business sale between Member States) is the initial sale. This sale is zerorated, thus the purchase is without VAT. If the same goods participate in the same fraud
multiple times, making multiple trips across community borders then the goods appear to
be on a carousel, hence the name carousel fraud.8 For example, in a widely reported case
a twenty-one year old appeared to be selling 10% of the world supply in a particular kind
of computer chip, when in fact he had only one box of chips going round-and-round in
UK-Irish trade.9
Missing Trader Fraud in Services
Recently missing trader fraud has morphed into services. Fraudsters engaged in
this variant exploit an oversimplification in the definition of “taxable supply” found in all
VAT/GST regimes. It is common to define goods as tangible property, and then to define
services as everything else. However, not all services are the same – some are readily resold like goods rather than immediately consumed like services.10 As a result, this
variant of the fraud can occur between Argentina and Chile, or Nigeria and New Zealand,
or Australia and France.
Because missing trader fraud relies on the re-sale of a supply purchased without
VAT, and because most of the early frauds were detected in goods, it is common to
assume that this fraud is confined to goods. However, in services that are bought and
sold like goods (tradable services) missing trader fraud is flourishing. It has been
undetected for years.
Services-based missing trader fraud is common in CO2 permits, VoIP, mobile
minutes, cloud computing and more. The great difficulty in services-based missing trader
fraud is that the commodity evaporates on use. It is one thing for an auditor to find a box
of computer chips riding a carousel, it is quite another for an auditor to find VoIP
termination minutes that have been sold, re-sold before being fully used.
Thus, while it appears that there are two classes of taxable supplies (goods and
services), there are in fact three – goods, tradable services and consumed services. The
first two of these are susceptible to missing trader fraud.
8

Europa Press Release, Commission proposal on temporary measures for a consistent response to carousel
fraud in certain sectors – Frequently Asked Questions (Memo/09/423 (Sept. 29, 2009) available at:
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/09/423&format=HTML&aged=0&langu
age=EN&guiLanguage=en
9
HMRC Press Notices, Healey Hails Success of VAT Crackdown (Sept. 25, 2003) available at:
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/newsroom_and_speeches/press/2003/press_121_03.cfm
10
For example, the EU VAT is imposed on taxable transactions. Taxable transactions are either the supply
of goods (the transfer of the right to dispose of tangible property as owner), or the supply of services (any
transaction which does not constitute a supply of goods). Art. 5(1), Sixth EC VAT Directive/ Art. 14(1),
Council Directive 2006/112/EC and Art. 6(1) 1st subpara., Sixth EC VAT Directive/ Art. 24(1), Council
Directive 2006/112/EC.
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Size of the Fraud
Missing trader frauds are so large in the EU that they have distorted national trade
statistics in the UK.11 They are largest single frauds uncovered in jurisdictions as wide
ranging as Canada,12 Italy,13 and Poland.14 The Russian mob has long been suspected of
being involved in missing trader fraud.15 The Ndrangheta mafia (a crime syndicate from
the toe of the Italian boot) uses missing trader frauds to launder money (at a profit)
through the Italian telecommunications system.16 Although it is possible to trace missing
trader funds and fraudsters from Berlin (Germany), to Dubai (UAE), and on to Lahore
(Pakistan), there is no direct proof that missing trader fraud is a terrorist funding source.17
Some however, are suspicious about the ultimate destination of the funds.18
Accurate numbers are not available either for a single Member State, or for the
EU as a whole. There are certainly no reliable estimates of global losses, or losses
suffered in non-EU jurisdictions. In 2006 the UK estimated that it had experienced

David Ruffles & Tricia Williams, Report on further research into the impact of Missing Trader Fraud on
UK Trade Statistics, Balance of Payments and National Accounts, Statistics and Analysis of Trade Unit,
HMRC & UK Office of National Statistics, available at:
https://www.uktradeinfo.com/pagecontent/documents/Further_Missing_Trader_Fraud_Research.pdf
12
Regina v. Prokofiew, [2004] G.S.T.C. 103 (Mar. 22, 2004)
13
Operazione “Phuncards-Broker,” Tribunale Ordinario di Roma, Sezione Distrettuale, Dei Giudici per le
Indagini Preliminari, Ufficio 40 [Ordinary Court of Rome, Section G.I.P.-G.U.P. – Office 40]
Procedimento N. 6429/2006 R.G. Contro Arigoni Fabio +55 [Case number 6429/2006 R.G. Against Fabio
Arigoni +55] Giudice per le Indagini Preliminari Aldo Morgigni [Judge for Preliminary Investigations Aldo
Morgigni]. Available at: http://www.genovaweb.org/doc/ord_BROKER-1pt.pdf;
http://www.genovaweb.org/doc/ord_BROKER-2pt.pdf; and
http://www.genovaweb.org/doc/ord_BROKER-3pt.pdf.
14
Supra note 5.
15
Ashley Seager & Ian Cobain, Carousel fraud: Bogus deals keep Customs in a spin: Smart criminals stay
ahead of investigators Russian mafia and IRA linked to swindles, Guardian (May 9, 2006) available at:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2006/may/09/ukcrime.ashleyseager
16
Stacy Meightry & Sabrina Cohen, Billionaire Is Sought In Sweeping Fraud Probe, WSJ at B5 (Feb. 24,
2010); Richard T. Ainsworth, The Italian Job – Voice Over Internet Protocol MTIC Fraud in Italy, 58 TNI
721 (May 31, 2010).
17
Reports on the terrorist link in the press can be found generally, but a recent and older report gives some
sense of the level of recognition. Paul Fletcher, Round and Round – From Rags to Riches, COMMERCIAL
FINANCE TODAY (March 18, 2009) available at:
http://www.commercialfinancetoday.co.uk/2009/03/18/mtic-carousel-fraud/; Alan Travis & Ashley Seager,
Reid Wants Europe to Fight VAT Fraud Linked to Terror Funds, The Guardian (October 26, 2006)
available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2006/oct/26/eu.terrorism;
18
Press Review: Agreement on the European Union to combat against so-called "carousel fraud" possibly
linked to terrorism (Resumen de Prensa: Acuerdo en la Unión Europea para luchar contra los llamados
"fraude carrusel" posiblemento vinculados con el terrorismo), SEPBLAC – TIMESONLINE (Oct. 27,
2006) (indicating that, “The six biggest EU states [Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Poland] have
pledged to join forces in the fight against the growing problem of so-called carousel fraud, a multi-billion
pound tax scam the Government believes is linked to terrorism”) available at:
http://www.sepblac.es/espanol/noticias_de_prensa/2006/10/articulos/ocbe-126-06.htm (in Spanish);
Financial Action Task Force, Laundering the Proceeds of VAT Carousel Fraud, 8 (Feb. 23, 2007) available
at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/16/3/38335020.pdf
11
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MTIC losses of between £2.98 and £4.47 billion.19 The German government had similar
estimates.20
During the same 2006 period Europol’s “best estimate” for MTIC fraud in the EU
as a whole was €23 billion.21 If we assume that this base-line estimate was accurate in
2006, then it is still accurate in 2010. The reason is simple – one of the results of
domestic enforcement actions that was clearly set out by Dr. Cheetham at the House of
Lords in 2006 is that its adoption of the most popular “solution” (a product-specific
reverse charge) by less than all VAT jurisdictions is a transformative not a curative
event. The country adopting the standard solution becomes a base-camp for VAT-free
supplies that can be sent into the other jurisdictions.22 Overall the fraud is not reduced; it
maintains the same volumes or probably increases in scope.23 As a result, when Europol
estimated in 2009 that there was an additional €5 billion in CO2 MTIC fraud (in the EU
alone) we should take this figure as an additional amount of MTIC that should be
aggregated into earlier estimates. Thus, MTIC in the EU has probably risen to at least
€28 billion.24
Reckon LLP completed a study of the VAT tax gap for the EU Commission in
2009 (also based on 2006 data). It indicated that the two most significant research efforts
to measure MTIC fraud were those of HMRC (mentioned above) and another study by
19

H.M. Treasury, 2006 PRE-BUDGET REPORT: INVESTING IN BRITAIN’S POTENTIAL – BUILDING OUR LONG
TERM FUTURE 126 (Dec. 2006) Cm 6984, available at: http://www.hmtreasury.gov.k/media/5CC/43/pbr06_completereport_1439.pdf (indicating that “… attempted MTIC fraud
was between 3.5 billion pounds and 4.75 billion pounds in 2005-06; with an estimated negative impact on
VAT receipts during the year of between 2 billion pounds [or 2.98 billion euro] and 3 billion pounds [or
4.47 billion euro].”) See also: H.M. Revenue & Customs, MEASURING INDIRECT TAX LOSSES – 2006 6 &
21-25 (Dec. 2006) available at:
http://customs.hmrc.gov.uk/channelsPortalWebApp/channelsPortalWebApp.portal?_nfpb=true&_pageLabe
l=pageLibrary_ConsultationDocuments&propertyType=document&columns=1&id=HMCE_PROD1_0264
23 (setting out the methodology used to determine estimates in the 2006 PRE-BUDGET REPORT.)
20
European Commission, Communication of the Commission to the Council in accordance with Article
27(3) of Directive 77/388/EEC, COM(2006) 404 final at 4 (indicating that German estimates of 2006 losses
to all types of VAT fraud are 2% of total VAT receipts – or 8 to 10 billion euro – with roughly one third
attributable to missing trader fraud) available at
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/COM(2006)404_en.pdf; Euro2day, ECOFIN
EU Presidency’s Steinbrueck says Reverse Charge VAT on Agenda for April, (Jan. 30, 2007) available at
http://www.euro2day.gr/articlesfna/27924825/ (“German finance minister Peer Steinbrueck said … VAT
fraud costs €8-10 billion in Germany annually …”).
21
Europol Press release, Experts discuss ‘Missing Trader Inter-Community Fraud, (Dec. 13, 2006)
available at: http://www.europol.europa.eu/index.asp?page=news&news=pr061213.htm (reporting on
meeting at Europol of 40 experts from 22 E.U countries gathered to discuss ways to fight MTIC fraud
where a report from Eurocanet, the European Commission sponsored task- force on fraud provided figures
that MTIC fraud cost the EU €23 billion between June 2005 and June 2006).
22
Richard T. Ainsworth, CO2 MTIC Fraud – Technologically Exploiting the EU VAT (Again), 57 TNI 357,
370-72 & Figure 3 (Jan. 25, 2009).
23
Fraud will increase when the supply is made in goods. The reason is that the fraudster’s distribution lines
are shortened. Instead of transporting goods to back and forth to Dubai (a 2 or 3 day journey), the goods
can be circulated within the EU (transit time of 1 day or less). The carousel simply moves faster.
24
Europol Press Release, Carbon Credit fraud causes more than 5 billion euros damage for European
Taxpayer (Dec. 9, 2009) available at:
http://www.europol.europa.eu/index.asp?page=news&news=pr091209.htm.

4
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1677997

the Belgian Finance Ministry.25 The Belgian estimates (which also do not include CO2
MTIC) are somewhat lower than the Europol estimate for the entire EU (€19.9 billion as
compared with €23 billion). However, the Belgian estimate for MTIC in the UK was
considerably higher than the UK’s own estimate of losses (€8.85 billion as compared
with the UK’s range of between £2.98 and £4.47). Reckon cannot explain the
differences.26
The only conclusion that can be drawn about the size of the MTIC problem in the
EU is that current estimates are highly speculative, and they clearly miss entire classes of
fraudulent transactions. EU losses are enormous. However, because VoIP and other
tradable services types of missing trader fraud are not confined to the EU there is much
more to measure, and it will take considerable international cooperation to combat it.
As a result, the issues raised here impact OECD discussion on harmonizing
VAT/GST rules in services and intangibles,27 just as much as they impact EU efforts to
combat services and intangibles MTIC in Europe.28 They should also be a key policy
concern in the US, if there is a sustained effort to design and implement a US VAT.
Solutions - Technology
MTIC is a technology-intensive fraud. Thus, it only stands to reason that
technology will offer solutions, probably the best solutions.
A transaction in tradable services can be completed in minutes,29 and the theft of
the VAT can occur in the next few minutes. The return on which the trade is reported
may easily be due several months into the future. If the intent is to commit fraud the
funds will pass at lightning speed through a series of domestic and foreign banks (Dubai,
25

RECKON LLP, STUDY TO QUANTIFY AND ANALYZE THE VAT GAP IN THE EU-25 MEMBER STATES, Sept.
21, 2009, (analysis based on 2006 data for all EU Member States, except Cyprus) available at:
http://www.reckon.co.uk/item/cb5873cb.
26
Id., at ¶ 383.
27
There are three reports of OECD activity in this area. See: OECD, COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS,
WORKING PARTY NO. 9 ON CONSUMPTION TAXES, APPLYING VAT/GST TO CROSS-BORDER TRADE IN
SERVICES AND INTANGIBLES – EMERGING CONCEPTS FOR DEFINING PLACE OF TAXATION – INVITATION FOR
COMMENTS (January 2008) http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/42/11/39874228.pdf; OECD, COMMITTEE ON
FISCAL AFFAIRS, WORKING PARTY NO. 9 ON CONSUMPTION TAXES, APPLYING VAT/GST TO CROSSBORDER TRADE IN SERVICES AND INTANGIBLES – OUTCOME OF THE FIRST CONSULTATION DOCUMENT
(June 2008) http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/31/40931170.pdf; OECD, COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS,
WORKING PARTY NO. 9 ON CONSUMPTION TAXES, APPLYING VAT/GST TO CROSS-BORDER TRADE IN
SERVICES AND INTANGIBLES – EMERGING CONCEPTS FOR DEFINING PLACE OF TAXATION – SECOND
CONSULTATION DOCUMENT – INVITATION FOR COMMENTS (June 2008)
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/13/40931469.pdf
28
Most recently see: Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, On the
application of Council Regulation (EC) no 1798/2003 concerning administrative cooperation in the field of
value added tax COM(2009) 428 available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/tax_cooperation/combating_tax_fraud/
COM_2009_0428_EN.pdf
29
Aline Robert, La fraude a la TVA du CO2 se revele gigantesque, La Tribune 22 (Dec. 16, 2009) (in
French, original and translation on file with author) (discussing that the average time is 15 minutes for a
MTIC transaction to be closed out on the BlueNext exchange in Paris.)

5
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1677997

India, Hong Kong, Pakistan, China and Russia are common transit points). When a
withdrawal is made (in cash) on the other side of the world the stolen VAT becomes
impossible to recover, and the supply that supported the fraud has evaporated.30 The only
thing that slows down missing trader fraud down is the nature of the supply – goods must
be delivered;31 services and intangibles simply need to be made available.
The three leading technology-based solutions will be considered – the real time
VAT (RTvat),32 the VAT Locator Number (VLN) system,33 and the Digital VAT (DVAT).34 There are important differences among these solutions, but in general terms, the
RTvat focuses on securing that tax, the VLN focuses on the securely tracing the supply,
and the D-VAT certifies that the correct tax is charged, collected, and remitted. RTvat is
a mandatory system for all transactions. In the EU it would need top be adopted
throughout the Community. The VLN is also mandatory, but it can be adopted by a
single jurisdiction. The D-VAT is a voluntary system, but it would need to be made
mandatory in market segments where fraud is suspected (cell phones, computer chips,
VoIP or CO2 permits for example).
RTvat
The RTvat essentially moves the point of taxation from the invoice date to the
settlement date.35 In addition, the RTvat is a cash-basis system that mandates debit cards
and wire transfers of tax amounts in real-time directly to the tax authorities when
payments are made.36 The key to the RTvat (this proposal has been made for the EU, and
considers MTIC in goods, not tradable services) is the network of twenty-seven identical
servers that it establishes which are linked together as communication and fund transfer
centers.
The proposal requires that each Member State establish a national server system
that is separately owned and operated by a national Public/ Private Partnership. The
private sector participants will fund the investment and operating costs, and the tax
30

FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, LAUNDERING THE PROCEEDS OF VAT CAROUSEL FRAUD (Feb. 23,
2007) (see for example the £36m UK carousel, based in southern Spain which had Swiss bank accounts,
but where funds are eventually withdrawn in cash in Hong Kong, and others funds invested in Spanish real
estate are later old and re-invested in Las Vegas after passing through the Commonwealth of Dominica and
Gibraltar).
31
Teleos plc & Others v. Commissioner of Customs and Excise. Case C-409/04, at 42 (determining that
goods must “physically [leave] the territory of the Member State of supply” to qualify as an intracommunity supply).
32
Chris Williams, RTvat: Outline of proposed real-time VAT collection system to increase efficiency of
collection, maximize revenue, minimize fraud and reduce administrative burden on business, (Dec. 5, 2009)
available at: http://www.rtvat.eu/.
33
HOUSE OF LORDS, EUROPEAN UNION COMMITTEE, STOPPING THE CAROUSEL: MISSING TRADER FRAUD IN
THE EU (REPORT WITH EVIDENCE) HL Paper 101(May 25, 2007) 7 (testimony of Dr. Michael Cheetham
setting out the VLN proposal).
34
Richard T. Ainsworth, Carousel Fraud in the EU – A Digital VAT Solution, 42 TNI 443 (May 1, 2006)
(setting out a fully digital solution for MTIC fraud)
35
RTvat, Information Brochure – An Introduction to a real-time solution for Improving the EU VAT system
(January 3, 2009) at 14, available at: http://www.rtvat.eu/.
36
Id., at 13
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administration would share in any surplus from the revenue stream generated through
transaction fees.37 All VAT payments would be required to be made through this system.
The RTvat changes the EU VAT from a withholding to a direct payment system.
Sellers (other than those selling to consumers) will never hold the buyer’s VAT.38
Instead of requiring sellers to collect and remit VAT, the RTvat uses electronic payments
to remove the VAT component from a buyer’s payment, and then remits this amount to
the tax authority in real-time. Thus, if business X purchases goods from business Y for
100 cu39 in a jurisdiction where the VAT rate is 20%, X will pay 120. But instead of
requiring the seller to collect, hold and remit 20 in VAT, the RTvat uses the automated
payment system to send this amount directly the tax authority. The seller will receive
100 (and notification that 20 was sent to the tax authority).
Although the RTvat indicates that this system has not been looked at before,40
VAT withholding (and automated VAT withholding) systems have been in place in Latin
American countries for a number of years.41 A similar (pre-digital) system was proposed
for the EU called the PVAT.42
For example, in the Dominican Republic 30% of the VAT reported on all invoices
paid with a credit card is withheld by the credit card company and remitted to the tax
authority (if VAT is not listed on the invoice the withholding is 100%). The seller is
notified of a VAT payment made on his behalf.43 Puerto Rico’s sales tax is
contemplating the same withholding regime for the full amount of the tax due on all
invoices paid with credit or debit cards.44
Williams, RTvat, supra, note 32 at 7.
Business-to-consumer (B2C) transactions would be handled in the traditional manner, with VAT held by
the seller, and remitted to the tax authority in batches (not transactionally in real-time).
39
All examples are in currency units.
40
Williams, RTvat, supra, note 32 at 7.
41
Mexico, Ecuador, Chile, Argentina, Colombia and Venezuela have systems like this.
42
See also the Prepaid VAT (PVAT) proposal that requires vendors to collect VAT on all sales, domestic
and interstate, with the sole exception of interstate sales where the buyer prepays the VAT to the state of
destination – and provides proof of this payment to the vendor. Proof would be a tax deposit receipt. Satya
Poddar & Eric Hutton, Zero-rating of Interstate Sales Under a Sub-national VAT: A New Approach, in
NATIONAL TAX ASSOCIATION PROCEEDINGS: NINETY-FOURTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE (2001) 200-07.
43
Decree (DR) 140-98; Tax Code (DR) 11-92; General Regulations (DR) 02-05 & 08-05.
44
Standard & Poors, GLOBAL RATINGS PORTAL, RATINGS DIRECT, Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corp.;
Sales Tax 6 (May 18, 2009) available at: http://www.gdbpur.net/investors_resources/documents/COFINA05x2009SP.pdf
Collection and payment procedures
Sales tax revenues are collected on a monthly basis by First Data Corp., a provider of
electronic commerce and payment solutions for businesses and consumers; Banco
Popular de Puerto Rico; or any other authorized collector designated by the Secretary of
the Treasury. Merchants have until the 10th of every month to remit sales tax collections
for the prior month. Collectors transfer sales tax revenues on a daily basis to a bridge
account at Banco Popular in the name of the Treasury Department, as paying/receiving
agent. Once the funds are deposited in the Banco Popular bridge account, Banco Popular
then transfers on a daily basis (with a two-day delay) to the trustee collections from the
entire 5.5% sales and use tax until the base amount has been deposited in the DSTF, and
thereafter to the Treasury Department all subsequent sales tax collections until the
37
38
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The RTvat proposal anticipates a staged roll-out, with the first stage confined to
domestic transactions in a Member State and a second stage where intra-community
transactions are handled. Only during the second stage will MTIC be eliminated. This
stage requires a single VAT registration across the EU. MTIC is cut-off with the RTvat
because a business buyer will always pay domestic VAT on purchases (even purchases
made across a Community border). In the example used above, 100 will be remitted to
the cross-border seller, and 20 will be sent directly to the buyer’s jurisdiction. There will
be no reverse charge. Cross-border sales will be taxed at the applicable rate in the
buyer’s jurisdiction, not zero-rated by the seller in expectation that the buyer will perform
a reverse charge.
The RTvat will impact businesses that take advantage of cash flow opportunities
under the current system. It requires the immediate payment of VAT on value added at
each stage of production, and for some businesses this will mean that they will finance
the VAT (this is particularly the case in a down economy where inventory is purchased
but not easily re-sold). The RTvat will also not resolve B2C frauds, like for example, the
use of automated sales suppression technology at the point of sale to skim cash sales
(Zappers and phantom-ware applications).45 Only the D-VAT (of the three proposals
considered here) could provide this kind of comprehensive fraud prevention.
VLN
The VAT Locator Number system is the simplest of the three technology
solutions to adopt. It is the least disruptive to the current VAT system. Law changes are
minimal. It was formulated and proposed by Dr. Michael Cheetham at the House of
Lords hearings, May 25, 2007.46 The VLN solution is very targeted. It is only looking at
MTIC, and how to prevent it.
The most significant policy change made by the VLN proposal is the denial of a
buyer’s input credit if a seller pays VAT on an invoice with an invalid VLN (or no VLN
at all). The most significant procedural change is that businesses would need to secure a
VLN (when selling supplies) or validate an opposing trader’s VLN (when purchasing
supplies). In most cases accountancy software platforms would make automated requests
for VLNs from the central (government) computer system, and make automatic
validation requests in the same manner. Each link in the commercial chain would be
given a number, and the numerical sequence would follow the goods (or services) from
initial manufacture through to final consumption. A back-up system where VLNs could
be secured through an internet web site or a call center would be available.47
department has received its share (2.75%/5.5%) of the collections received to date in the
fiscal year.
See also: Department of the Treasury (Puerto Rico), RFP for Technological Improvements for Collections
and Fiscalization of Sales and Use Tax (March 12, 2010) available at:
http://www.hacienda.gobierno.pr/downloads/avisos/IVU_Improvements_RFP_March12_2010.pdf
45
Richard T. Ainsworth, Zappers – Retail VAT Fraud, INTERNATIONAL VAT MONITOR (May/ June 2010)
175.
46
Supra, note 33.
47
Dr. Michaels Cheetham, Personal e-mail communication (April 25, 2010) (on file with author).
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The VLN system requires the seller on each transaction to secure and print on the
invoice the encrypted VLN. The number would be unique to this transaction (based on
the essential data elements of the invoice, and prior related VLNs from transactions up
the commercial chain). The VLN number will be attached to the invoice, either
numerically or as a bar code that can be scanned and read with an optical reader.48 The
advantage of a bar code and optical reader capabilities is that a trader can quickly scan
the VLN bar code into a national database to verify the VLN.
A similar fraud prevention system is in place in Brazil, where it has proven to be
highly reliable. In Brazil invoices receive a digital bar code at the inter-state border
(from a federal computer feed). The bar code is used to validate the invoice and the
physical transit of the goods.49
Two examples of the VLN may be helpful. The first involves a standard crossborder sale within the EU. The second explains what happens if a trader sells without a
VLN. Importantly, the response of the next trader in line to the lack of a VLN is to pay
all the VAT to the tax authority to secure a VLN that will allow him to continue to re-sell
the purchased supplies. No VAT is paid to the business that sells without a VLN. MTIC
is eliminated, and the commercial chain continues uninterrupted. It is expected that the
merchant that sold without a VLN will be penalized (and that business may find it more
difficult to secure a VLN in the future because a risk assessment would suggest that this
trader needs more careful oversight).
Example #1
VLN Import Fact Pattern
If business B-1 in France sells goods or service to a business (B-2) in the UK, B-1
will zero rate and B-2 will request a VLN (for the reverse charge) from HMRC (VLN-1).
The VLN request will include the essential elements of the invoice received from B-1.
48

A similar bar code will be added to each cash register receipt issued by Quebec restaurants under their
enforcement effort directed against Zappers. The Sales Recording Module (SRM) is a device that secures
ECR data and uses it to digitally sign each receipt with a bar code that can be read with a hand-held optical
scanner. This will allow short inspections – where an auditor in a thirty-minute visit, observes that
customers are receiving receipts, and then quickly verifies (with the scanner) that the receipts being issued
are recorded in the SRM. Full inspections can follow in cases of irregularities. Gilles Bernard, Solutions
for the Under-reporting of income in the Restaurant Sector, Federation of Tax Administrators Annual
Conference, Denver Colorado (June 2, 2009) powerpoint slides at 15-17 (on file with author).
49
A number of Brazilian states and the federal government signed an agreement on September 30, 2005 to
create (1) the "e-invoice" ("Nota Fiscal Eletrônica") and (2) the "auxiliary document of the e-invoice"
("Documento Auxiliar da Nota Fiscal Eletrônica"). AJUSTE SINIEF N.º 07 DE 30 DE SETEMBRO DE
2005) available at:
http://www.sef.rj.gov.br/legislacao/tributaria/convenios_ajustes_protocolos/confaz/ajustes/2005/aj05007.sh
tml. On December 20, 2005, through the ATO COTEPE/ICMS N.º 72 DE 20 DE DEZEMBRO DE 2005
http://www.sef.rj.gov.br/legislacao/tributaria/convenios_ajustes_protocolos/confaz/pareceres_ecf/2005/ato0
72_05.shtml the structure of the e-invoice was established and testing was initiated with nineteen
companies and those companies and six states. The program has been deemed a success and has been
extended.
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The HMRC will perform a risk assessment, and if B-2 is deemed to be a low risk
importer (the risk we are concerned with is whether or not B-2 is likely to “go missing”),
then a VLN number will issue.
VLN-1 is an encrypted identifier that will be the basis of subsequent VLNs. The
B-2 to B-3 transaction will be accompanied by VLN-2. It will be requested by B-2, and
will include within its encryption base not only data related to the B-2/B-3 transaction,
but data from VLN-1. This allows for the construction of a digital trail. B-3 will not be
allowed a deduction for VAT paid if either there is no VNL on the invoice B-3 receives,
or if the VLN it receives on the invoice is invalid.
Chart #1

VLN-1&2 – encrypted numeric &
scanned bar code on invoice
identifying vendors, goods & trail.
One number merges all data.
Confirming the VLN
– OK to pay VAT ?

&
France

UK
Goods or Services

B-3

VAT
B-1

B-2
?
?

Goods or
Services
Automated request for a
“reverse charge” VLN followed
by a request for a re-sale
VLN(essential elements of
invoice)
‐ Good/ service code
‐ Quantity
‐ Price paid
‐ Vendor ID
‐ Vendee ID

?

HMRC Central Computer System
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Example #2
Sale Without Valid VLN Fact Pattern
As before (B-1, a business in France sells goods or service to business B-2 in the
UK; B-1 will zero rate; B-2 applies for a VLN for the reverse charge) B-2 receives VLN1 from HMRC after a risk assessment determines that B-2 is a low-risk-to-go-missing
importer.
However (for some reason) B-2 re-sells to B-4 without securing a re-sale VLN.
In this situation B-4 would be unlikely to pay VAT to B-2, because B-4 would be denied
a VAT deduction for the amount paid. Instead, if B-4 wants to complete the trade it will
pay the VAT directly to the Treasury, effectively performing a reverse charge. B-4 will
now receive (from HMRC’s Computer System) a VLN number that will allow it to
deduct the VAT upon re-sale.
When the re-sale occurs B-4/B-5 there will be a request for a VLN for this
transaction (it may be that quantities are different for the B-2/B-4 transaction; changes
could have been made in the product). With the new VLN (which would associate back
to the VLN B-4 received from HMRC, and also associate back to the VLN B-2 got from
HMRC) it will be possible to make a sale to B-5, impose domestic VAT, and remit it in
the normal manner.
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Chart #2
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D-VAT
Certified tax software and a conditional change in the standard place of supply
rules can solve MTIC. Certified software is currently being used in the US retail sales
tax by 23 states50 under the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement (SSUTA).51 The
same software mechanisms could be applied to the VAT to solve missing trader fraud.
50

These twenty-three states are divided into two groups, the full members, and the associate members. A
full member state is a state that is in compliance with the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement
through its laws, rules, regulations, and policies. Those states are: Arkansas, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin (as of Oct. 1,
2009) and Wyoming. An associate member state is a State that has achieved substantial compliance with
the terms of the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement taken as a whole, but not necessarily each
provision, and there is an expectation that the state will achieve compliance by January 1, 2008. Those
states are: Ohio, Tennessee, and Utah, see http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org (last visited Jan. 24, 2009).
51
STREAMLINED SALES AND USE TAX AGREEMENT (adopted November 12, 2002, amended November 19,
2003 and further amended November 16, 2004) available at http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org
[hereinafter SSUTA] (providing for fully digital compliance with sales and use taxes through certified
intermediaries and certified software solutions).
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Similar to the VLN proposal the D-VAT proposal changes the place of supply
(and thereby the party who was required to remit the tax) based on whether or not the
businesses involved in the transaction employed certified tax software. Under the VLN
the determinant was whether or not a valid VLN appears on the invoice.
Certified tax software solution. A testing regime for the certification of
enterprise-level transaction tax software is required.52 The software would be
comprehensive – capable of: (a) determining the correct tax for each transaction and
calculate the VAT amount due, (b) posting this amount on the appropriate invoice, (c)
linking each VAT input or output amount to the correct VAT return, and (d) completing
the VAT return accurately. In addition, the software will need to verify whether or not
the companion system used by the other trader is also using certified software or not.
Business use of certified software is voluntary. In some instances however,
notably when an enterprise is heavily engaged in transactions deemed inherently prone to
missing trader fraud – like tradable emissions permits, cell phones, or computer chips – a
jurisdiction might make certified software mandatory. In addition, in a judicial
proceeding the government could seek (as a fraud remedy) the use of certified software
“going forward,” because of proven instances of fraud in the past.53
52

The SSUTA certification process involves measuring software against three third party standards; (1) the
AICPA’s SAS 94 [AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, PROFESSIONAL
STANDARDS, Vol. 1 AU § 319 The Effect of Information Technology on the Auditor's Consideration of
Internal Control in a Financial Statement Audit, as amending SAS No. 55 Consideration of Internal
Control in a Financial Statement Audit]; and (2) the US- GAO Federal Information Systems Control Audit
Manual [U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ACCOUNTING AND INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
DIVISION, FEDERAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS CONTROL AUDIT MANUAL, (FISCAM) Vol. 1 (GAOAIMD12.19.6) available at http://www.gao.gov/special.pubs/ai12.19.6.pdf.]. In addition, software
developers must comply with (3) ISO Number 17799 [INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR
STANDARDIZATION, ISO 17799: INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, SECURITY TECHNIQUES, CODE FOR
INFORMATION SECURITY MANAGEMENT (ISO/IEC 17799:2005)]. A discussion of similar standards for
certification and accreditation of software can be found in the recent O.E.C.D. materials [Electronic
Commerce: Facilitating Collection of Consumption Taxes on Business-to-Consumer Cross-Border ECommerce Transactions, O.E.C.D. (Feb. 11, 2005) at 9 & 17-18 available at http://www.oecd.org.
Indicating that, “… a global intermediary may be based in one country and would undertake intermediary
activities in as many countries as suppliers are required to collect and remit consumption taxes on behalf of
e-commerce suppliers. In cases where satisfactory levels of approval or financial security are evident,
countries could be more relaxed …”. The OECD discusses a range of government “approvals” for tax
accounting software. At one extreme is “accreditation,” an approval process functions simply as a
mechanism to “formally identify” software that meets certain criteria of acceptability. At the other extreme
is “certification,” an approval process that designates software as “an officially authorized mechanism to
perform specified functions.”].
53
This was the approach taken by Judge Lise Gaboury of the Court of Quebec in the fraud case against the
28 restaurant chain Casa Grecque. In this instance the fraud involved installing an automated sales
skimming program called a Sales Zapper in the point of sale system (the networked electronic cash
register). In the Budget Speech of March 23, 2006 the Minister of Revenue had announced the adoption of
an automated system [module d’enregistrement des vents] that would be voluntary until 2011. Judge
Gaboury noted that the system was expected to be available by October 1, 2008 and required all of the Casa
Grecque restaurants to adopt it at this time as a condition of remaining in business. Revenue Quebec, Des
restaurants de la chaîne Casa Grecque coupables de fraude fiscal (in French only) available at:
http://www.revenu.gouv.qc.ca/eng/ministere/centre_information/communiques/ev-fisc/2006/10juillet.asp
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Four examples. If jurisdictions were to adopt certified tax software regimes there
are four possible permutations of transactions among enterprises using certified and noncertified tax software solutions. They are set out below.
Assume a taxable transaction between A and B where the parties are in different
jurisdictions (this could be the sale of goods or tradable services among Member States of
the EU, or a sale of tradable services between any two VAT jurisdictions). Under
standard formulations, the transaction will be zero-rated leaving A’s jurisdiction and
subject to a reverse charge entering B’s jurisdiction.
If B is using a certified system, there should be no problem with this transaction.
A certified system will always perform a required reverse charge regardless of the
certification of the other party’s system. B’s VAT return will be properly prepared along
with all related reports, and the funds will be properly remitted to the government. If
there is a problem it might only be when A is not using a certified system. The following
summarizes these applications:
1. A certified; B certified. If A and B are both using certified systems the zerorating and the reverse charge will be properly made, reported, and the VAT
remitted to B’s government, even if the transactions are occurring in suspect
classes of supplies (cell phones, computer chips CO2 certificates or VoIP).
2. A not certified; B certified. If A is not using a certified system and B is using
a certified system, then B will reverse charge. The only question will be whether
A’s jurisdiction will allow a zero-rating in this case. B’s certified system will
perform a reverse charge. If A was engaged in making supplies in a suspect
industry, zero-rating could be denied (if not, then zero-rating might be allowed
under traditional rules). The question would likely come down to whether or not
A’s jurisdiction is willing to accept B’s certification as proof that A had fulfilled a
due diligence obligation to verify that B was not participating in missing trader
fraud. If so, then A should be allowed to zero-rate the sale.
3. A certified; B not certified. If A is using a certified system and B is not, then
A’s system would recognize this and it would not zero-rate the transaction if it
occurred in a suspect class of supplies. Instead, it would impose the domestic tax.
B would then be in a difficult situation. Its’ purchases would be burdened with
the VAT of another jurisdiction, and it would remain obligated to comply with the
reverse charge in its own jurisdiction. Either double taxation or procedural
complexity (filing for refunds in A’s jurisdiction) would result. B would most
likely either seek a domestic supplier (who would charge domestic VAT) or
install its own certified system. This is the desired result in suspect supplies.
4. A not certified; B not certified. If A is not using a certified system and
neither is B, then the critical question is whether or not the transaction is deemed
to be within a suspect class of high-risk supplies. If for example A’s jurisdiction
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considered trade in cell phones to be suspect, then it should make all cell phone
transactions taxable at regular rates (domestic and cross-border). A will not be
allowed to deduct VAT paid on cell phone purchases, and it will be required to
collect VAT on all cell phone sales. In addition, B’s jurisdiction will require
VAT to be collected under a reverse charge.
It is expected – in a certification regime that is extended throughout a federal
system (the EU or Canada) – that notifications of certified status between automated
systems would be automatic, handled through a secure on-line connections. Dual
notifications would be expected: (1) A’s system, for example, would receive direct online notification that B’s system is certified from B’s system; in addition (2) B’s status as
a firm using certified VAT software would be confirmed through an on-line
acknowledgement by the tax administration in B’s Member State. All of this could occur
almost instantly. There are a variety of ways to do this but the most proven and secure
would be through the use of public key infrastructure (PKI).54 A’s system would access
the public key associated with B and use it to confirm that B’s system was certified.
With this knowledge, A would then draft an invoice without VAT and forward it to B. In
this way A would know that B’s system would perform the reverse charge.
In a sense this is simply automated due diligence. But in another sense, it is
certified due diligence. In an abundance of caution, it is expected that B’s certified
system will perform a reverse PKI inquiry (when it is notified that A’s system is checking
for certification). It would want to determine (in advance) that the invoice it is receiving
(without VAT) from for A is correctly issued.
CONCLUSION
The recent appearance of MTIC fraud in tradable CO2 permits and VoIP is a very
serious warning for the global VAT system. The size and scope of these frauds make it
very clear that this missing trader fraud is huge and it is spreading. The speed with which
it spreads is a reflection of the technology that makes it work. In tradable services this
fraud has no boundaries.
Three technology solutions are presented here. The RTvat and the VNL are
applied to all transactions in a VAT system. The RTvat changes the underpinnings of the
VAT. Moving it from an invoice to a settlement system. The VLN on the other hand,
leaves the basic structure of the VAT untouched, and simply adds an encrypted “tracer
code” to every invoice. The D-VAT accomplishes much of what the VLN does, but uses
certified tax software. The D-VAT can be applied selectively (to suspect classes of
supplies). It is also a voluntary system (admittedly with a number of incentives to get
businesses to “sign-up”). The D-VAT is the only solution that can be extended to cover
B2C transactions.

54

PKI is information technology infrastructure that enables users of a basically unsecure public network
(such as the Internet) to securely and privately exchange data through the use of a public and a private
cryptographic key pair that is obtained and shared through a trusted authority. In this case the trusted
authority would be the Member State that certifies the transaction tax software in the target entity.
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If the US is serious about adopting a VAT, it needs to consider the frauds that this
tax facilitates. They need to be pre-empted before the tax is enacted. Technology needs
to be placed at the service of the tax collector, not the fraudster.
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